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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARTHA A. ARREGUI, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an) 
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC, ) 
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and ) 
John and Jane Does 1 through X, whose true ) 
identities are unknown, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 38496-2011 
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III. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Introduction 
Defendants-Respondents Rosalinda Gallegos-Main, D.C., and her clinic - Full 
Life Chiropractic, P.A., (collectively hereinafter, "Chiropractor Main"), proffer in the 
first sentence of their Respondent's Brief that: "This is a medical malpractice case 
involving allegations of chiropractic physician malpractice." See Respondent's Brief, p. 1 
(emphasis added). This case is plainly not a "medical malpractice case". In fact, 
Plaintiff-Appellant Martha Arregui (hereinafter "Arregui") has definitively shown that 
chiropractic physicians, by express legislative declaration, do not hold a license to 
practice medicine in the state of Idaho. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15. Idaho 
Code § 54-704(3) provides: 
"Chiropractic practice, as herein defined is hereby declared 
not to be the practice of medicine within the meaning of the 
laws of the state of Idaho defining the same, and physicians 
licensed pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to the 
provisions of chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, nor liable to 
any prosecution there under, when acting within the scope 
of practice as defined in this chapter." (Emphasis added). 
In spite of this clear legislative declaration that chiropractic physicians do not practice 
medicine, Chiropractor Main erroneously characterizes the very nature of this case as one 
involving medical malpractice. The inaccurate characterization of the nature of the case 
may be innocent enough in the singular, but represents only one exemplar of a string of 
mischaracterizations that start from the first sentence and run through the remainder of 
the brief submitted by Chiropractor Main. 
At the end of the day, this case involves the district court's commission of clear 
error when applying the "sham affidavit" doctrine to a case that does not involve a sham. 
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In fact, the district court acknowledged the lack of a sham on the record when stating, 
"And as Mr. Johnson pointed out, I find no - no deception on the part of the 
chiropractor." Tr., p. 62, Ll. 4-6 (emphasis added). 
B. Arregui did not suggest the Sham Affidavit Doctrine does not or 
should never apply to Testimony given by Expert Witnesses. 
The next mischaracterization made by Chiropractor Main, perhaps worthy of a 
reply, relates to the distinction drawn by Arregui between expert witnesses and fact 
witnesses. Arregui does not contend on appeal that the "sham affidavit" doctrine does 
not apply to expert witnesses. Nonetheless, Chiropractor Main incorrectly states, 
"[Arregui's] sole argument is that the sham affidavit does not apply to expert witnesses, 
i.e. clear contradictions from an expert are allowed because experts are allowed to 
'update' their testimony at any time." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. This statement by 
Chiropractor Main reflects a serious misunderstanding of Arregui's position on appeal. 
Arregui's point in her Opening Brief is only that there is a distinction between lay 
witness testimony and expert witness opinions, and the difference in the two ought to be 
considered when a court is looking to "prevent[] the use of manufactured testimony" in 
line with the rule taken from Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint 
Master Trust, 2007 WL 1035158, 12-13 (D. Idaho). 
In fact, an expert witness is permitted if not expected to make factual assumptions 
when rendering opinions. In Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 327, 73 P.2d 83, 86 
(1937), the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly addressed the role of the expert when faced 
with conflicting evidence: 
The testimony of an expert as to his opinion is not evidence 
of a fact in dispute, but is advisory, only, to assist the triers 
of fact to understand and apply the testimony of other 
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witnesses. Its value depends on, arnong other things, the 
expert confining himself in his testimony to the facts 
incorporated in the question propounded to him, and if he 
does not assume these facts to be true and base his answer 
on them, his testimony is worthless and should be rejected. 
It is for the triers of fact to determine whether the evidence 
on which the expert bases his opinion is true or not. It is 
not for the expert to assume the responsibility of 
determining the truth or falsity-the reliability or 
unreliability, of the testimony of other witnesses. For this 
reason he should not be asked to base his opinion on the 
testimony of other witnesses which he has heard, but the 
facts which that testimony tends to establish, and which is 
relied on by the party propounding the question, should be 
hypothetically stated, and the testimony of the expert 
should be responsive to that question, and it is his duty to 
assume those facts to be true. 
Citing Cochran v. Gritrnan, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289. 
Here, Arregui is forced to continue to make the distinction between experts and 
fact witnesses for a valid reason. She does it because Chiropractor Main first below and 
now on appeal, through the creation of a table, continues to compare Dr. Tarnai's 
affidavit testimony with her deposition testimony in a disingenuous manner. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-24. In setting up this table, Chiropractor Main primarily 
attempts to illustrate Dr. Tarnai has been inconsistent in testifying about whether 
Chiropractor Main performed a "cervical adjustment" on Arregui or merely performed a 
"range of motion" test. Id 
However, as Dr. Tarnai explained during her deposition, it is not so much that she 
has been inconsistent on this factual issue, but more so that the record is in conflict on 
this point. On several occasions during the course of her deposition, Dr. Tarnai made 
note of the conflict in the record between Arregui' s description of the treatment provided 
compared to Chiropractor Main's description of the treatment provided. See Tarnai 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3 
Depo. Tr.,p. 27, LI.I0-24;p. 34, LI.18~p. 35, LI. 6;pp. 159-161, startingatR., Vol. 
II, p. 168. When Dr. Tarnai presumes a cervical rotational adjustment was done, she has 
consistently opined that this would be unreasonable and imprudent or contraindicated or 
in breach of the standard of care. See Tarnai Depo. Tr., p. 161, LI. 10 - p. 162, LI. I, 
starting at R., Vol. II, p. 218; see also Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C ~7 at R., Vol. I, p. 
138; see also Dr. Tarnai's October 15, 2010, written report, second to last paragraph at 
R., Vol. I, p. 146. 
Thus, to the extent Dr. Tarnai's testimony in relation to whether Chiropractor 
Main simply tested Arregui's range of motion or performed a cervical adjustment is 
inconsistent, it is adequately explained on the basis that in one instance Dr. Tarnai 
presumes Arregui's version is true and in other instances presumes Chiropractor Main's 
version is true. As stated in the passage quoted from Evans, supra, "It is not for the 
expert to assume the responsibility of determining the truth or falsity ... of the testimony 
of other witnesses." Id As Dr. Tarnai confessed in her deposition, she does not know 
who is right - doctor or patient - but it is not her job to make such a determination as that 
task belongs to the jury. 
Perhaps most compelling on this front is the fact the district court never found a 
single inconsistency along the lines of any of the alleged inconsistencies cited in the table 
created by Chiropractor Main. See Tr., pp. 38-43. The only inconsistency noted by the 
district court had to do with the fact at the time of her deposition Dr. Tarnai had not yet 
spoken to a local expert, but by the time of the making of her affidavit she had: 
I further conclude that the affidavit clearly contradicts the 
prior deposition testimony and that it was clear that at that 
time, Dr. Tarnai was not aware of the local standard of care 
in this community. 
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Id at p. 39, Ll. 17-23. 
However, the district court's decision to strike the Tarnai Affidavit on the basis of 
the aforementioned single inconsistency, constituted clear error. The "general rule" from 
the sham affidavit doctrine only applies if the court, "make [ s] a factual determination that 
the contradiction was actually a 'sham.'''. Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 952 
F2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991). As previously noted by Arregui, the district court in the 
instant matter found "no deception on the part of the chiropractor [Dr. Tarnai]". Tr. p. 
62, Ll. 4-6. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is not a medical malpractice case. Rather, it involves a claim for bodily 
injuries brought by Arregui against her chiropractic physician for negligently causing 
Arregui to suffer a stroke when treating her on June 4, 2007. It is clear the legislature 
intended only for those physicians licensed to practice medicine in the state of Idaho to 
reap the protections of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013. Other arguments advanced by 
Chiropractor Main in Respondent's Brief are adequately covered in Arregui's Opening 
Brief, and therefore will not be rehashed here. 
Wherefore, Arregui respectfully maintains her request of this Court to reverse the 
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Chiropractor Main. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i day of September, 2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Bmailed 
o hand delivered 
o transmitted fax machine 
to: (208)319-2601 
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